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Book Review
Stephen Presser, Law Professors: Three Centuries of Shaping American Law, St. Paul,
Minn.: West Academic Publishing, 2017, pp. 502, $48.00.
Reviewed by Bernard W. Bell
In introducing his book, legal historian Stephen B. Presser places his work
in the tradition of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans (9). Perhaps
Presser is being a bit immodest both as to his own work and the profession
about which he writes. For readers less acquainted with the classics, Robert L.
Heilbroner’s The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic
Thinkers, which describes the theories and lives of seven leading economic
theorists, provides a more accessible and quite possibly more apt analogy.1
Presser chronicles the ideas and lives of twenty foundational scholars in the
American legal tradition. He begins with an English law professor, William
Blackstone, who had a profound influence on eighteenth-century American
legal thought, through his Commentaries on the Law of England.2 He then discusses
one of the first American law professors and an important framer of the
United States Constitution, James Wilson. As Presser explains, Wilson
adapts Blackstonian principles to an American context, emphasizing law’s
foundation on the consent of the governed rather than religious principles
(40).3 Presser’s biographical sketches proceed chronologically to the present,
including such contemporary scholars as Richard Posner, Patricia Williams,
Catherine McKinnon, Antonin Scalia, and Cass R. Sunstein. Presser largely
ignores professors who have had a profound effect through their advocacy
and development of litigation strategies. Thus, he omits figures such as
legendary Howard Law School Dean Charles Hamilton Houston, Rutgers/
Columbia Law School’s Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Pennsylvania/Stanford/
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1.

Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Life Times and Ideas
Great Economic Thinkers (7th ed. 1999). The first edition was published in 1953.

2.

Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1111, 111213 (2006).

3.

Presser does not discuss St. George Tucker, who became the second professor of law at
William & Mary in 1790. Tucker’s influential edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries included
essays describing American law adaptations of Blackstonian principles. Id.
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NYU’s Anthony G. Amsterdam, central figures in the fights against Jim Crow
laws, gender inequality, and the death penalty.4
Some of Presser’s choices are a bit quirky. He includes two fictional law
professors, Lewis Eliot, a British barrister and law professor created by English
philosopher C.P. Snow, and the more recognizable Charles Kingsfield of The
Paper Chase.5 He also includes Barack Obama, as the first elite law school
faculty member to become President of the United States.6 Obama, as Presser
notes, taught part time at the University of Chicago, produced no scholarship,
and primarily practiced law and served as a state legislator while on the
faculty. Unlike other professors Presser chronicles, Obama left the academy
to become an elected legislator and chief executive, not a jurist. Presser’s
inclusion of Obama is particularly odd given the book’s heavy focus on both
theoretical jurisprudence, virtually excluding clinical education, and judges’
roles in interpreting the law, largely disregarding legal interpretation by elected
officials, administrators, or even practicing lawyers.
In Law Professors, Presser pursues two separate projects. First, he seeks to
provide a relatively objective survey of the ideas expressed by the law professors
who have most influenced American legal thought, particularly regarding the
nature of law, the role of judges, and constitutional interpretation.7 He hopes
the book will serve as an introduction to law for undergraduates in law-related
fields and for J.D. and LL.M. students (6). His chapters on Blackstone, Wilson,
Joseph Story, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Christopher Columbus Langdell,
and John Henry Wigmore, for example, provide insightful and thoroughly
4.

No wonder Presser finds apposite Oliver Wendell Holmes’ quip that “academic life is but
half-life—it is withdrawal from the fight in order to utter smart things that cost you nothing
except the thinking them from a cloister.” Stephen Presser, Law Professors: Three
Centuries of Shaping American Law 468 (2017).

5.

The Eliot chapter, a fascinating piece of literary exposition, is the book’s longest. But
fictional Harvard Law Professor Michael Lightcap, the protagonist in the 1942 film Talk of
the Town, might better have illustrated Presser’s concerns about the contemporary state of
the law. During the summer Lightcap is awaiting his confirmation hearings to become a
Supreme Court justice, he finds his rather analytical view of the law challenged by Leopold
Dilg, a political activist and, unbeknownst to Lightcap, a fugitive accused of murder.
Lightcap’s discovery that Dilg is being “railroaded” profoundly changes his view of the
law. The implication is that personal experience is critical to becoming a good jurist and
that legal scholarship is often irrelevant. Presser criticizes President Obama for seeking
Supreme Court nominees who “knew what life was like” for a member of a minority or
a single mother. Presser, supra note 4, at 12-13. And the perception of legal scholarship as
irrelevant is perhaps not as unique to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as
Presser believes.

6.

He disregards Bill Clinton, who taught at the University of Arkansas Law School from 1973
to 1976. Presser, supra note 4, at 440.

7.

Surprisingly, given the nature of his concerns about contemporary law, Presser does not
include a chapter on Harvard Law Professor Lon L. Fuller, Oxford’s H.L.A. Hart, and their
debate on legal positivism. Legal positivism pointedly challenges the proposition that law
reflects an underlying deism or morality.
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engaging introductions to their ideas and their competing positions on several
fundamental jurisprudential questions.
Presser’s other project is his search for an explanation of the law’s current lack
of authority both in the public mind and within the legal profession.8 In other
words, he wants to know why the law is “broken,” and who broke it. Presser
argues that the legal academy has rejected a catechism well-understood in the
eighteenth century: “[S]ocietal order require[s] law, law require[s] morality,
and morality require[s] religion” (8). In his view, modern academic thought
has “abandoned the Blackstonian notion[s] that the law could be a clear,
certain, and binding constraint on judges” and reflect “universal principles,
principles of morality that were dictated by the Deity” (456). Instead, the
current conception of law reflects the view of “justice” offered by Greek
rhetorician Thrasymachus: “Justice is nothing but the advantage of the
stronger” (458 & fn. 1354).
Presser presents a list of culprits responsible for the current conception of
law, most particularly critical legal scholars, President’s Barack Obama’s view
of the law as infinitely malleable, the inadequately theorized constitutional
jurisprudence of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy,
Cass Sunstein’s “liberal paternalism,” and academics’ attack on textualism
and originalism in constitutional interpretation (illustrated by the work of
Akhil Amar and Bruce Ackerman). Presser notes that these forces have not
gone unopposed—Antonin Scalia, Mary Ann Glennon, and others have
stood as modern-day versions of Horatio at the Gate, seeking to preserve
the determinativeness, authority, and indeed majesty, of the law (457).
Nevertheless, Presser asserts, the prevailing academic winds have made law
professors irrelevant.9
Does the law lack authority in the public and in the profession, and,
if so, who’s responsible?
The answer to the question implicit in Presser’s book, whether the law
lacks authority, differs depending on whether the focus is the public or the
profession.
8.

Presser sees “a crisis in legal education, and even more alarming, a broader crisis in the law
itself”— “all three branches of government . . . appear routinely to ignore the dictates of the
Constitution, and indeed, the requirements of the rule of law itself.” Presser, supra note 4, at
4-5.

9.

In support he cites D.C. Circuit Judge and former law professor Harry T. Edwards’ criticism
of legal scholarship. See as an example, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992-1993). Presser, supra note 4,
at 6-7. Edwards’ criticisms do not seem to align with Presser’s, and Presser does not explain
how they do. Indeed, Presser’s focus on theoretical legal scholarship as a source of the
law’s current maladies suggests that such scholarship has had all too great an impact on the
profession’s and the public’s conception of law.
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As for the public, a general skepticism toward a wide range of institutions
and professions has long existed.10 Public cynicism toward law, courts, and
other governmental institutions no doubt reflects these broader attitudes.
With respect to the perception that law is radically indeterminate and
influenced by judges’ own contestable values, such high-profile matters as
the Bush v. Gore decision (based on a “good for one ride only” equal protection
principle) and the Office of Legal Counsel “torture” memos probably have a
greater impact on the public perception than the scholarship of the professors
Presser chronicles.11 Books like The Brethren that offer an inside look at judicial
decision-making surely contribute to a more cynical view of judging.12 And the
image derived from the adversarial process, that lawyers are “mouthpieces”13
or “hired guns” who will take any position that advances their clients’ interests
(and, relatedly, that lawyers view the law as something to be gotten around),
has little to do with the culprits Presser identifies.
As to the profession, do most practicing lawyers (or sitting judges) view the
law as radically indeterminate? I suspect in most cases lawyers can distinguish
legal and illegal conduct in advising their clients.14 And often lawyers view the
law as less malleable than their clients view it, frequently advising their clients
that the law precludes a particular course of action (or at least will subject
them to legal liability).
This is not to deny that lawyers have some cynicism about judicial decisionmaking, or at least question the Blackstonian conception that judges engage
10.

Confidence in Institutions, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.
aspx(results of polling regarding public confidence in the police, organized religion, the medical
system, the public schools, banks, organized labor, the criminal justice system, newspapers,
television news, and big business); see Brian Kennedy, Most Americans Trust the Military and Scientists
to Act in the Public’s Interest (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/18/
most-americans-trust-the-military-and-scientists-to-act-in-the-publics-interest/.

11.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (precluding Florida from recounting votes in disputed
presidential election on equal protection grounds); Jack Goldsmith, The Terror
Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 141-72 (2007) (discussing
Office of Legal Counsel memos finding that enhanced interrogation techniques, such as
waterboarding, did not constitute “torture”).

12.

Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (1979).
And how can the public not question the definiteness of law when the Supreme Court renders
numerous 5-4 decisions that seemingly reflect relatively stable partisan voting blocks? Such
doubts are magnified by the increasingly polarized confirmation process, a sure sign that,
despite any professions to the contrary, legal elites believe that judges’ subjective views
strongly influence their decisions.

13.

William Bryk, Bill Fallon, the “Great Mouthpiece” and Archetypal Amoral Criminal Defense Lawyer (Nov.
13, 2001), http://www.nypress.com/bill-fallon-the-great-mouthpiece-and-archetypal-amoralcriminal-defense-lawyer/; Robert H. Jackson, The Lawyer; Leader or Mouthpiece, Judicature 70,
71, https://www.roberthjackson.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/The_Lawyer_Leader_
or_Mouthpiece_.pdf (speech given Aug. 24, 1934).

14.

Many judicial decisions are relatively unconstrained, not because of any indeterminacy in
the law, but because of the indeterminacy of the facts. “Trial” judges’ powers to resolve factual
controversies (outside of the jury trial setting) give them great leeway in many cases.
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in “finding” the law in value-neutral ways.15 Law professors teach and write
that judges are not value-neutral and that there is more to judicial decisions
than the explanations judges offer in judicial opinions. In particular, judicial
opinions do not provide a complete picture of the conscious and unconscious
influences on judges’ decisions. And a significant body of academic work treats
judicial decisions not as fixed variables from which law must be ascertained,
but as dependent variables to be explained using approaches borrowed from
other disciplines.16
But if there is a perception of a radical indeterminacy in the law, it predates
the era of legal scholarship that most concerns Presser. For example, a prime
expression of the radical indeterminacy of statutes is Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, in which the U.S. Supreme Court appears to equate statutory
interpretation with policymaking, and accords administrative officials a prime
role in interpreting statutes precisely because they are accountable to elected
officials.17 Yet the justices who decided Chevron were surely not devotees of
critical legal theory, critical race theory, feminist legal theory, or the like.
The view that the Constitution’s text is indeterminate took hold long
before the Warren Court began or the schools of thought Presser finds most
problematic established themselves. As early as 1819, in McCulloch v. Maryland,
Chief Justice John Marshall noted that the Constitution was, of necessity,
imprecise and that “only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be
deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”18 In the 1930s, for example,
a Supreme Court majority stated matter-of-factly: “If by the statement that
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is
intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to
the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their
time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.”19
But what of Presser’s claims against the particular culprits he identifies?
15.

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 68-71 (1769) (explaining that
judges do not declare new law, but merely find the law that already exists). Even Blackstone
seems to have viewed this as a pretense. Id. at 69 (when judges overrule precedents, they
“pretend” that they are not making new law, but merely correcting an earlier misstatement of
the law). And no less a purist than Justice Scalia seems to have agreed. James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive . . . as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, which is
to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what
it is today changed to”).

16.

Perhaps this is one source of the disjunction between judges, who must largely treat
precedents as fixed variables, and scholars.

17.

467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984); see Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA and the Scope of Judicial Review:
Importing Chevron into State Administrative Law, 20 Widener L.J. 801, 813-15 (2011).

18.

McColluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).

19.

Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
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Judging Presser’s culprits
Presser argues that Barack Obama’s failures to enforce the law have
undermined respect for “law” and the determinacy of law (445, 447-48). Presser
seems most disturbed about the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”) and the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”)
programs providing relief for certain undocumented aliens.20 (450-51, 46061). But Barack Obama was not the first President to exercise regulatory
forbearance or broadly interpret executive power.21 Indeed, the tightening
of standing requirements beginning in the 1970s and 1980s was designed,
at least in part, to provide government officials flexibility in complying with
constitutional and statutory dictates. In essence, when no individual can show
concrete harm, standing doctrine makes legal constraints on government
judicially unenforceable.22 In 1983 then Circuit Judge Scalia colorfully
explained the salutary effect of the Court’s increasingly strict standing doctrine:
Does what I say mean that, so long as no minority interests are affected,
“important legislative purposes, heralded in the hall of Congress, [can be]
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy?” Of
course it does—and a good thing, too. Where no peculiar harm to particular
individuals or minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought
to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday’s herald is
today’s bore—although we judges, in the seclusion of our chambers, may not
be au courant to realize it.23

Other aspects of the Burger/Rehnquist Court jurisprudence accentuated
the executive branch’s freedom from restraint, including doctrines cutting back
on implied rights of action and making administrative inaction unreviewable.24
Presser attacks Justices O’Connor and Kennedy for their incompletely
theorized jurisprudence (437, 471-72). But there is something to be said for
20.

Raquel Aldana, Congressional Dysfunction and Executive Lawmaking During the Obama Administration,
91 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3, 5 (2016) (discussing the DACA and DAPA programs).

21.

The nonenforcement of civil rights by the Reagan Department of Justice provides an
example; see, Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 393, 410-12 (1989); Drew S. Days III, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration
and Civil Rights, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 309, 313 (1984). Another example can be found in
the torture memos in the Bush administration, see note 11 supra..

22.

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982).

23.

Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk
U.L. Rev. 881, 897 (1983).

24.

See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). President Obama’s
nonenforcement of certain aspects of the immigration laws and criminal prohibition on
marijuana illustrate another point, namely that laws widely perceived as unduly harsh or
cruel may well breed disrespect for law. See generally Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization:
The Limits of the Criminal Law 12 (2008). Many states and localities have pursued policies
that contravene aspects of the immigration laws and the prohibitions on marijuana. Aldana,
supra note 20, at 9-10 (immigration); Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical
Marijuana Policies: A Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 2-6 (2013) (marijuana).
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judicial minimalism.25 The tasks facing academics and judges differ. Focusing
on the particulars of a case, an approach shared not only by Kennedy and
O’Connor, but also by Judge Richard Posner, for example (301), is entirely
appropriate for a judge. Such an approach is neither an embrace of radical
indeterminacy nor even a reflection of the lack of an underlying broad
conception of the law.26
Presser views Sunstein’s response to the insights of behavioral economics
(namely that government should embrace nudging) as an imminent threat to
liberty (427, 433). Nudging, which Sunstein describes as “liberal paternalism,”
involves managing presentation of information or setting defaults to
counteract cognitive biases that can lead individuals to make decisions
that do not reflect their own true preferences. Can nudging be abused? Of
course.27 But Presser too peremptorily dismisses Sunstein’s approach as an
excuse for government manipulation (427, 435-37). Sunstein’s behavioral
economics insights, properly applied, could help ensure true autonomy.28 The
nudges the federal government adopted while Sunstein headed the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs have not remotely had the impact Presser
fears.29 In any event, Presser does not clearly explain the connection between
this critique and the contemporary perception of law as indeterminate.
Presser reduces critical race theory to personal narratives expressing critical
race scholars’ disillusionment with law (406, 412, 418) and calls for a
Thrasymachian redistribution of resources (458). He suggests that his chosen
exemplar of the school, Patricia Williams, could be considered an “anti-law
professor” (406). While creating and analyzing narratives is an important
strand of critical race theory, surely it does not occupy quite so large a place in
critical race studies and is not as solipsistic as Presser suggests.30 And critical race
theory is not an attack on the potential majesty of law or a mere justification
25.

Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). Presser views
Sunstein’s judicial minimalism as having a political tilt. Presser, supra note 4, at 431, 437.

26.

Perhaps Presser’s criticism of O’Connor and Kennedy is really aimed at their reluctance in
the context of societal efforts to dictate certain personal choices, reflected in their opinions
regarding abortion and same-sex intimacy. But recognizing that some decisions are a part of
constitutionally protected liberty (or even embracing a “harm” principle) hardly severs the
relationship between law and morality.

27.

See Bernard W. Bell, Simpler: The Future of Government—Cass Sunstein, 64 J. Legal Educ. 126 (2014).

28.

Presser does not comment on Sunstein’s public deliberation theory, which lays bare
deficiencies in group decision-making and seeks to find ways to facilitate meaningful
widespread participation in the polity. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1574-75 (1988).

29.

Bell, Simpler, supra note 27, at 129 (discussing modification of miles-per-gallon disclosures on
new cars and the transformation of the food pyramid to the food plate). The supplementation
of the warning on cigarette packs with graphic pictures of smoking’s consequences is the
most disturbing nudge implemented during Sunstein’s tenure. Id. at 129, 132.

30.

For a description of critical race theory, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical
Race Theory: An Introduction (2017).
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for redistribution. It challenges subjective assumptions masquerading as the
application of value-free, neutral principles. Such scholars argue that extant
legal doctrines and principles do not merely treat certain groups less favorably
than they might be, but are unfair, and unfair in a way that betrays the ideals
of justice. They seek a “law” that is really majestic, not merely one that falsely
purports to be.
Akhil Amar’s and Bruce Ackerman’s theories are certainly contestable, and
reflect a trend toward viewing constitutional, or at least quasi-constitutional,
principles as capable of establishment outside of the constitutional amendment
process.31 Even skeptics might acknowledge that “popular constitutionalism”
provides a narrative that can explain periods of rapidly shifting constitutional
doctrine. Skeptics might also consider such theories a basis for Burkean
conservatism in constitutional interpretation, namely acceptance of practices
and doctrines that have proved salutary even if they might seem at odds with
constitutional text or practices extant during the founding era.32 And ultimately,
in terms of the majesty of the law Presser craves, it is an understanding of the
Constitution fully constrained by text and original understanding, divorced
from any broader concepts of justice, that undermines the law’s majesty.33 Such
a view is particularly problematic when the relevant text is ambiguous and
the original understanding largely inaccessible.34 Even with all the materials
available from the founding period, to us the original understanding
shared by those who framed and ratified the Constitution is surely radically
indeterminate.
As to the critical legal studies movement, I have little to offer. However,
I will say this: Presser does a poor job of explicating the movement and his
31.

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New
American Constitution (2010); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from
the Courts (1999).

32.

As then Professor Holmes said, “The life of the law has not been logic, it has been
experience.” O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881). By way of contrast, Justice Thomas
regularly asserts his desire to upend broad areas of constitutional doctrine based on his
assessment of the Constitution’s text and “original understanding.” See, e.g., Camps Newfound
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-11 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dormant Commerce
Clause); Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 18-22, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Eighth
Amendment).

33.

Obergefell v. Hodges,135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (Kennedy, J.) (“The nature of injustice is that
we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom
in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”).

34.

Indeed, textualism, at least in statutory interpretation, is often associated with interest group
theory, one of the most profound challenges to the concept that law has an underlying
coherence. Interest group theory asserts that legislation results from the interplay of interest
groups. It thus casts doubt upon the concept of a broader “public interest.” See Bernard
W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory
Interpretation, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1. 22-23 (1999). Indeed, the theory suggests that law generally
reflects the interests of smaller groups rather than larger ones, a truly Thrasymachian result.
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apparent conclusion that the movement had a major impact on the profession’s
and the public’s view of the nature of the law.
Would law be more authoritative if the catechism that that law is a
determinate, fixed, and certain set of rules embodying morality and inspired
by God, i.e., “societal order require[s] law, law require[s] morality, and
morality require[s] religion,” reemerged? In exploring the nature of authority,
sociologist Richard Sennett observed: “Something incontestable and certain,
something which brings people together: that is the bond of authority.”35
Indeed, Sennett observes, religious authority rests on the necessary illusions
of miracle and mystery. He quotes Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor:
Men seek to worship only what is incontestable, so incontestable, indeed,
that all men at once agree to worship it together. For the chief concern of
these miserable creatures is not only to find something that I or someone else
can worship, but to find something that all believe in and worship, and the
absolutely essential thing is that they should do so together.36

If Law Professors does not convince us that Presser’s catechism is correct,
Presser is asking the academy to teach and write as if his catechism were true
so as to uphold the law’s authority. Such an endeavor is unlikely to succeed,
even if the legal academy were willing to embrace it—law too obviously lacks
Blackstonian certainty. And ultimately, surely no academic discipline could
commit itself to such deception.

35.

Richard Sennett, Authority 194 (1980).

36.

Id.

